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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
International news networks often call the former President of Colombia, Juan Manuel 
Santos (2010-2018), a peace dove after he was able to successfully negotiate a peace deal 
between the state and the leftist-guerrilla the FARC in 2016. BBC have even noted the 
transition from ‘hawk to a dove’ implying that this leader had not always been as pacific as 
he had been in the past years (BBC.co.uk, 2018). However, it remains to be seen the degree 
to which this transition from a violent and corrupt country ―as a result of legacies dating 
back over 50 years and the drug trafficking business that boomed in Colombia―, to a 
peaceful and modern country has been made. Furthermore, whether these efforts have also 
been made to improve Colombia’s image and reputation internationally. In the context of an 
ever more globalized world, smaller and emerging powers have to compete on the 
international arena in order to achieve their foreign policy goals. Scholars have argued that 
countries no longer compete by pursuing power through hard measures such as military 
threats and economic sanctions. Rather, there has been an increased importance in the use 
of soft power measures to achieve foreign policy goals. 
 
One of such measures is public diplomacy. This thesis will conduct an analysis of the public 
diplomacy strategies used during the administration of the former Colombian president 
Juan Manuel Santos. This will be done by analysing the foreign policy goals established 
during this administration and studying the corresponding public diplomacy strategies. 
This focus is motivated by the limited discussion surrounding emerging powers such as 
Colombia and their public diplomacy strategies. The main body of literature on public 
diplomacy covers primarily the pioneers of this subject mainly U.S. and European states. 
However, in the case of many developing countries, in Latin America and Africa in 
particular, there is minimal if any discussion on how these states use public diplomacy in 
their foreign policies. This thesis is aimed at not only providing insight on how a Latin 
American state uses this tool in its foreign policy strategies, but also, to argue that while 
Western and developed states are often thought of as the ones who possess greater soft 
power and public diplomacy strategies, smaller less developed states can also use these 
tactics to serve their national interests. Therefore, the following research question is raised: 
What has been the public diplomacy strategy used by Colombia during the rule of President 
Juan Manuel Santos? 
 
This thesis is structured as follows: chapter 1, entitled Public Diplomacy’s Theoretical 
Background, discusses some of the definitions used for public diplomacy; the main 
disciplines that have written about; and provides two communication frameworks which 
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will be applied in chapter 3 during the analysis. Chapter 2, The Crippling Legacy of Armed 
Violence in Colombia, is centred on the decades of violence that has formed the breeding 
grounds for the formation of guerrillas, drug traffickers, and paramilitary organizations; 
and on the involvement of the state in these periods of violence. Furthermore, some 
quantitative data is used to illustrate some of the impact the violence has had on the 
Colombian society and some of the results of Plan Colombia. Chapter 3, Promoting a New 
Colombia Abroad, provides an overview of Juan Manuel Santos’ political career, the core 
analysis is based on a combination of national policy and foreign policy goals. In the 
conclusion of this thesis, the most important findings of the three chapters will be 
presented and used in order to answer the research question. In addition, some possible 
avenues for further research in the case of Colombia’s public diplomacy strategies are 
mentioned. 
 
In terms of the method used in this thesis, it consists out of analysing of primary and 
secondary bibliographic references. The corpus of these references are policy plans and 
foreign policy strategy documents from the Santos administration.  
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CHAPTER 1 
Public Diplomacy’s Theoretical Background 
 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
Public diplomacy was a term coined by Edmond Guillon in 1965 (Cull, 19). This term was 
used during that period to describe the process through which international agents try to 
achieve foreign policy goals by engaging with foreign publics (Cull, 31). However, since that 
time, this term has gained more popularity amongst scholars due to its increased use as a 
strategic foreign policy tool by both scholars and diplomats. In this chapter, some of the 
definitions of public diplomacy and the new public diplomacy will be discussed. In addition, 
it will review the scholarly debates surrounding public diplomacy. Finally, this chapter 
describes Zaharna’s communication frameworks to analyse public diplomacy initiatives 
used in foreign policy strategies. 
 
 
1.2 Defining Public Diplomacy and the New Public Diplomacy 
 
As mentioned above, public diplomacy is a relatively new concept in the international 
relations lexicon. However, this concept has taken on a more complex meaning and has 
shifted away from being the name for propaganda activities used during the Cold War by 
both the U.S and the former Soviet Union to win hearts and minds for their ideological 
cause. First, it is important to distinguish public diplomacy from diplomacy. As Jan Melissen 
puts it, diplomacy is about the relationship between representatives of states or 
international actors. On the other hand, public diplomacy is about targeting the general 
public in foreign societies such as non-official groups, organizations and individuals 
(Melissen, 5). Nancy Snow manages to put this distinction in a simpler manner: while 
traditional diplomacy is government-to-government relations on one hand, public 
diplomacy can be considered as governments talking to global publics (Snow, 6). According 
to Snow, traditional public diplomacy consists out of the following activities: efforts to 
inform, influence and engage those publics in support of national objectives and foreign 
policies. 
 
When scholars discuss public diplomacy, they often cite Hans Tuch’s definition of public 
diplomacy which is “a government’s process of communicating with foreign publics in an 
attempt to bring about understanding for its nation’s ideas and ideals, its institutions and 
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culture, as well as its national goals and policies” (Tuch, 3). Other early conceptualizations 
of public diplomacy can be summarized as follows: Public diplomacy describes the efforts of 
the government of one state to communicate foreign peoples in order to affect their 
thinking and the thinking of their governments (Gilboa, 57). Fullerton and Kendrick 
elaborate on the notion of governments trying to influence foreign publics. The public 
diplomacy tactics governments need to use to achieve influence in foreign publics include: 
cultural and educational exchanges, foreign aid and development and international 
broadcasting (Fullerton and Kendrick, 1333). However, Gilboa has argued, these types of 
definitions have proven to be incomplete and problematic. 
 
Despite the vague nature of public diplomacy, some authors argue for a re-evaluation of this 
term and its activities in order to reflect the current international relations system where 
the main players have expanded from governments of states to include NGO’s such as large 
corporations, religious organizations, ideological groupings and even individuals. Three 
revolutions resulting from the increased level of globalization and interconnectedness of all 
aspects in the world pose new challenges to public diplomacy. These revolutions happened 
in mass communication, politics and international relations; they have changed the nature 
of public diplomacy in the post-9/11 and post-Cold War era according to Gilboa. First, the 
revolution in communication technologies caused the innovations of the Internet and global 
news networks, for example CNN International, BBC World and the more recent Al Jazeera. 
As a result, both the internet and the international broadcasting networks have become the 
main fountain of information about global affairs. This has also increased the opportunities 
for everyone – governments, NGO’s, companies, and individuals to express and exchange 
their ideas about world affairs. In addition, it has made foreign audiences more critical 
about global affairs. Politically, many societies have shifted from autocracies to 
democracies. This in turn has increased mass participation in political processes. The final 
revolution that has been considered as the cause of the current challenges that public 
diplomacy practitioners and scholars face has occurred in international relations. The goals 
and means of foreign policy have changed, placing the priority on having a favourable image 
and a favourable reputation around the world. States have been cultivating their image and 
reputation through attraction and persuasion rather than pursuing the acquisition of 
territory, access and raw materials through the use of military and economic tactics (Gilboa, 
56). 
 
These revolutions have caused information to flow more freely worldwide and have 
included larger parts of the population in the decision-making process, consequently, states 
have had to invest their resources to not only broadcast a favourable image to their 
audiences. They also are required to communicate with them to receive both feedback and 
to understand what a favourable image would be in order to boost their reputation abroad 
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and achieve their foreign policy goals. Snow argues that in recent times, public diplomacy 
has evolved to include how government and private individuals and groups directly and 
indirectly influence public attitudes and opinions of publics that have direct influence on a 
different government’s foreign policy decisions (Snow, 6). In addition, governments and 
their respective diplomats need to compete for the attention of their target audience with 
the communication efforts of NGOs such as corporations, that also impact the perception of 
the international audience towards their own policies and the policies of governments. 
 
The term ‘New Public Diplomacy’, has been offered as the adjusted version of public 
diplomacy that better reflects which is defined as a new form of public diplomacy has that 
includes multi-directional communications between the government and its audience. 
Furthermore, there is an increased emphasis on exchange, dialogue and mutuality in new 
public diplomacy. Cull adds to this notion of new public diplomacy another term. According 
to this author ‘public diplomacy 2.0’ is also part of the public diplomacy lexicon and refers 
to the way online media can be used in public diplomacy strategies. Public diplomacy 2.0 
has three key characteristics: (1) the capacity of technology to facilitate relationship 
building around social networks and online communities; (2) public diplomacy 2.0 relies on 
user-generated content such as feedback, blog posts, online videos and mashups; (3) there 
is an underlying sense of technology as being based on “horizontally arranged networks of 
exchange rather than vertically arranged networks of distribution down which information 
cascaded in the 1.0 era” (Cull, 125). Cull does not specify whether the so-called 1.0 era 
refers to public diplomacy or the new public diplomacy, or if he incorporates both terms 
into one era. 
 
However, as one starts to go through the list of variations on public diplomacy, the problem 
Gilboa pointed out above becomes clearer. It is as if public diplomacy can be used to refer to 
all forms of communication from governments to foreign public’s communication, to 
multidirectional communication between governments, NGO’s and individuals. At the same 
time public diplomacy fails to be a complete form of communication on its’ own. Despite 
this issue, scholars continue to analyse foreign policy strategies that employ public 
diplomacy because of its continued relevance in current debates. Going forward, it can be 
said that public diplomacy refers to strategies employed by governments, NGO’s and private 
actors to engage with foreign audiences to achieve their policy objectives. The ambiguous 
nature of public diplomacy has been addressed by different social science disciplines; these 
will be discussed in section 1.3 below. 
  
 9 
 
 
1.3 Public Diplomacy’s Disciplinary Background 
 
There are four principal disciplines within social sciences that have contributed to 
formation of the body of literature surrounding public diplomacy. The first disciplinary 
background comes from international relations theories. According to Gilboa, the increased 
importance of activities such as communication, education and persuasion as techniques of 
foreign policy, caused a decreased importance of the use of military force by states to 
achieve their foreign relations goals. As a result, foreign policy strategies incorporate three 
main components: Force, Diplomacy and Communication (Gilboa, 60). Out of these three 
components, he focuses on communication as being a “much more decisive factor” in 
current foreign policy strategies (Gilboa, 61). When one considers the shift in the field of 
public diplomacy, this focus on multi-directional communication can be attributed to the 
impact of the “revolutions” mentioned above in the international landscape. Gilboa sheds 
the light on Nye’s contribution to the field, which is the source of the distinction between 
hard power, soft power and smart power in international relations theory. 
 
By considering public diplomacy from an international relations theory perspective, Joseph 
Nye and Nancy Snow link public diplomacy to power. Power has traditionally been defined 
as the ability to alter the behaviour of others to get what you want (Gilboa, 61). To be 
specific, public diplomacy is considered as a tool of the term Nye dubbed as “soft power”. 
According to Nye, soft power is the ability to affect another to achieve the results one wants 
through attraction instead of using other methods such as coercion or payment (Nye, 94). 
This ability to shape the preferences of others through the power of attraction is related to 
intangible assets such as attractive personalities, culture, political values and institutions, 
policies that are seen as legitimate or having moral authority (Nye, 95). However, soft 
power is more than being able to shape the preferences of others, it is also the ability to 
entice and attract. Furthermore, according to Nye the resources that produce soft power 
often come from the values an organization or country has in its culture, the examples it 
sets by its internal practices and policies and by the way it treats its relations with others 
(Nye, 95). Following this reasoning, public diplomacy is a tool for governments to use in 
order to mobilize their soft power assets to communicate with and attract the publics of 
other countries, rather than merely their governments. In doing so, public diplomacy 
attempts to attract by focusing the attention of the target audience to the potential 
resources through a series of activities such as broadcasting, subsidizing cultural exports, 
arranging exchanges and so forth. 
 
However, if the basis of the country’s attraction assets (it’s values, culture, policies) are not 
attractive, public diplomacy strategies that promote and broadcasts these assets might not 
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produce soft power and could cause the opposite effect on the preferences of the target 
audience (Nye, 95). On the issue of attractiveness of a country’s values, policies, culture, 
Snow explains that they can measure their soft power advantage based on the following 
dimensions (Snow, 4): 
 
(1) when culture and ideas match prevailing global norms; 
(2) when a nation has greater access to multiple communication channels that can 
influence how issues are framed in global news media; and 
(3) when a country’s credibility is enhanced by domestic and international 
behaviour. 
 
The second discipline that contributes to the public diplomacy discussion according to 
Gilboa is the field of communication. In this field, the importance is placed on the media and 
influencing public opinion. On this matter of World Opinion, Wyne argues that with the 
decrease in broadcasting costs, both governments and NGO’s have greater ability to 
promote messages favourable to their appearance world-wide. On the other hand, the 
general population around the world has also gained more access to this flow of 
information. As a result, the international audience is better able to choose and shape news, 
increasing the number of players in the “court of global public opinion”  (Wyne, 40). 
According to him, world opinion should be considered in foreign policy. While states should 
not entirely base their foreign policy on foreign opinions, he finds that “it would also be 
foolish to ignore the impact foreign opinion can have on a country’s reputation” (Wyne, 41). 
Following this motivation, world opinion has the potential to have significant foreign policy 
consequences that could affect policy areas such as the military, economic policies, and 
politics. Furthermore, Wyne agrees with Nye that there is an increase in the importance of 
soft power, and a diminishing importance of the use of military force in foreign policy. He 
draws attention to what he calls the fourth form of power, namely perceptual power. This 
form of power, according to Wyne appreciates the influence of world opinion. According to 
Wyne, perceptions are based on: information, falsehoods, distortions, people’s biases and  
herd behaviour. Perceptual power is the most important power because it is shared among 
the largest number of actors, it is dynamic and shifts on the basis of daily events and it can 
crucially impact military policy, economic policy and politics (Wyne, 47). On a similar strain 
of thought Wang also recognizes the importance of having a positive reputation abroad in 
order to achieve foreign policy goals. According to Wang, the collective judgements of a 
country’s image and character are used to both explain and predict that country’s future 
behaviour. An indicator of a nation’s reputation is the world opinion of the country (Wang, 
91). 
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Another social science field that has chimed in to the discussion on public diplomacy is that 
of Public Relations. In this area, scholars have emphasized the similarity between public 
diplomacy and public relations in terms of the activities of image promotion and reputation 
management (Gilboa, 65). For instance, Signitzer and Coombs have argued that public 
diplomacy and public relations pursue similar objectives and use similar tools (137). In 
their feat to see which public relations models can be related to public diplomacy, they 
discovered that while the two fields pursue similar goals through similar means, the exact 
concepts and ideas that are transferrable from one area to the next have yet to be fully 
presented and tested (Signitzer and Coombs, 146). White and Radic also found similarities 
between public diplomacy and public relations. They argued that public diplomacy is the 
public relations of a country. By considering public diplomacy as a “strategic dialogic 
communication and relationship-building process” they have found that they both facilitate 
information exchange, both help to build positive perceptions and foster good will amongst 
actors (White and Radic, 459). 
 
The final discipline that has been closely related to public diplomacy is that of branding or 
as Simon Anholt has called it, “nation branding”. Nation branding means applying 
corporate branding techniques to countries (cfr. org, 2007). This is done in order to 
create what Anholt calls a competitive identity. Competitive Identity or CI is a model to 
increase a country’s competitiveness in the globalized world (Anholt, 5).  Gilboa 
simplifies this notion by arguing that these branding activities are focused on selling 
nations and places (Gilboa, 67). He found that there are similarities between public 
diplomacy and branding, however he also noted their differences. The similarities between 
public diplomacy and branding are image and symbols management, relationship building, 
and the use of mass media. The differences according to Gilboa were to be found in the 
goals and outcomes. In the case of branding, the goals and outcomes were related to 
increased sales while for public diplomacy the goals and outcomes were related to foreign 
policy. Additional differences could be found in the means used by the respective fields, the 
type of communication strategies the type of management, the language and the culture 
(Gilboa, 68). While Public Relations works in domestic situations and makes use of clichés, 
public diplomacy cannot be reduced to slogans and images (Gilboa, 68). Melissen also 
distinguishes public diplomacy from branding and nation branding. The two main 
differences between the fields according to Melissen are: 
 
(1) Branding has a higher level of ambition than public diplomacy. While the diplomats 
recognize and accept the limitations of public diplomacy, because public diplomacy 
campaigns assume that they are not the decisive factor in determining foreign perceptions. 
Branding projects employ a more holistic approach (Melissen, 23). 
 12 
 
(2) Branding can reflect a country’s aspiration and accentuate its identity, but it cannot 
change social realities. Rather than promoting an identity, public diplomacy seeks to 
primarily promote smooth international reputations (Melissen, 24). 
 
A critical analyst of foreign policy and diplomacy, Paul Sharp, has raised a valid question in 
his chapter on public diplomacy “Dumb Public Diplomacy”. Namely, while the authors cited 
above concentrated on the degree to which public diplomacy might be related to the social 
sciences disciplines, he raised the question about the “public” in public diplomacy. 
According to Sharp, this notion is also worth discussing when it comes to who are the target 
audiences in public diplomacy strategies. He raises the question of whether we should 
select a target audience or public, or if states should include the entire public (Sharp, 267). 
This goes against previous authors who always based their arguments on the assumption 
there is a target audience and that countries have pre-determined this factor before 
deploying their public diplomacy strategy. Therefore, moving forward, while in this thesis 
the target audience will not be analysed in depth, it will be interesting to see what the 
choices are from a strategic point and to consider who does and who does not belong the 
‘public’ side of public diplomacy. It would seem that the audience or the public would have 
to be linked to the policy goals that are meant to be achieved through public diplomacy. 
However, in this thesis it would be interesting to see whether the strategy that is used 
targets the entire world population as its public or if there are specific publics in specific 
countries that are targeted. 
 
 
1.4 Zaharna’s Communication Frameworks to Analyse the Initiatives of 
Public Diplomacy Strategies 
 
Because of the emphasis placed on the communication aspect of public diplomacy 
strategies in the literature surrounding public diplomacy, this thesis would like to analyse 
the strategy in the case study in chapter 3 from this perspective. While authors have argued 
that little effort has been made to provide a systemic method for analysis of public 
diplomacy strategies, Zaharna has proposed to use communication models and 
assumptions in order to conduct such analysis. Zaharna studied the communication 
assumptions and dynamics underlying how political entities try to communicate with 
international publics. He noted two perspectives of communication. On one hand, there is 
the view that communication is a linear process of transferring information with the goal of 
persuasion control. On the other hand, there is the view of communication as a social 
process that builds relationships and fosters harmony (Zaharna, 86). He also presents two 
communication frameworks to categorize and analyse the spectrum of public diplomacy 
initiatives used in public diplomacy campaigns. 
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First, there is the information framework, which focuses on designing and dissemination of 
messages to achieve political objectives. In this framework, information is gathered and 
used in an effort to promote policies, advance political interests, enhance images, or engage 
publics to achieve the goals of an individual political sponsor” (Zaharna, 87). The 
information framework is based on the following features (see Zaharna, 88): 
1. Messaging strategies: Determining the message and disseminating the message. 
2. Control: Political sponsors are able to determine the goal, message, time frame, 
channels and target audience. They are also able to control the planning, 
implementation and the evaluation of the initiative. Political sponsors also try to 
control the integrity and consistency of the message over different platforms. 
3. The interaction between the political sponsor and the public is limited. The public 
plays a passive role in the message and has no control over the planning and 
implementation of the message. 
4. The use of various communication channels to disseminate information (i.e.: 
interpersonal communication; audio/visual communication; print and broadcast 
mass media; electronic media). The most important media in this case are 
broadcasting and electronic mass media because they are most efficient.  
5. Goal-oriented/ Designed to achieve specific objectives: They try to measure the 
success of an initiative based on the set objectives. This is often done by quantifying 
information output and audience reach. To measure the impact of the information 
output, public opinion polls assess changes in the audience’s knowledge. 
 
The second framework is the relational framework, which focuses on relationship-building 
and the creation of social structures to advance political objectives (Zaharna, 86). The 
initiatives that are used to build relationships in the relational framework are: education 
and cultural exchange programs, cultural institutes and cultural relations, these are all 
examples of initiatives that use culture to build relationships (Zaharna, 86). The relational 
framework assumes that communication favours the notion of “fellowship” in ritual 
communication, the high-context focus away from messages, and the 
collectivist/interdependent concern for social cohesion and harmony discussed earlier. As 
has been noted above, public diplomacy initiatives focus on identifying, building and 
maintaining smooth international relationships. In the relational framework, relationships 
are the primordial feature (Zaharna, 91). Relational initiatives try to find commonalities 
and / or mutual interests between publics and ways to connect those publics through some 
form of direct interpersonal communication. This framework asks the questions “What 
relationships are important?” and “How can those relationships be established or 
strengthened?” (Zaharna, 91). The main features of the relational framework are (See 
Zaharna, 92): 
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1. They focus on relationship-building strategies rather than messaging strategies. 
2. They pursue coordination instead of control. Sponsors collaborate with their 
counterparts to design, implement, monitor and define an initiative. 
3. The public is an active participant/ stakeholder in relational initiatives because they 
stress participation over presentation.  
4. They focus on creating interactive communication channels and then enhancing or 
expanding those channels. 
5. Relational initiatives focus on continuity and sustainability. 
 
The initiatives in the relational framework are divided among three tiers or levels by 
Zaharna (See Zaharna 93-96): 
• First Tier Relationship-Building Initiatives: Exchange programs and visits. 
These programs and visits are elementary because they are done over a 
shorter time frame; they require a lower level of coordination and 
participation. The main limitation of these initiatives is that they focus on 
relationship-building at the individual level. 
• Second Tier Relationship- Building Initiatives: These activities have a higher 
level of public participation, longer time frame, more partnership 
coordination and public diplomacy skillsets than the first tier. Some of the 
examples of these initiatives are: Establishing Cultural and Language 
Institutes; Development aid projects; Twinning Arrangements, Relationship-
building campaigns; Non-political Networking Schemes.  
• Third Tier Relationship-Building Initiatives: Policy Networking Strategy and 
Coalition Building. This tier or relationship-building initiatives involves policy 
networking strategies that include coalition building with other countries and 
non-state actors to achieve policy objectives. 
 
When one considers the theoretical background of public diplomacy and its later strains 
(new public diplomacy, public diplomacy 2.0 etc.), it would seem that the strategies would 
resemble mostly the relational framework of communication Zaharna discussed. However, 
because the case study in the analysis of Chapter three has not had a lot of discussion 
surrounding public diplomacy strategies, it is worth noting whether in this case can be 
categorized within one of the communication frameworks or both, or not at all. 
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CHAPTER 2 
The Crippling Legacy of Violence and Armed Conflict in 
Colombia 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Colombia has had a particularly violent past, as some authors have argued since the start of 
the period known as La violencia, The Violence. This history of violence was caused by 
social, economic, political and territorial fragmentation of Colombia. In turn, this violence 
has also perpetuated further fragmentation of Colombian society. This chapter focuses on 
the decades of violence in Colombia’s recent history to assess the main actors and 
developments that have affected the nature of armed conflict in Colombia for over 50 years. 
In doing so, the aim is to gain better understanding of how the various waves of violence 
starting from the 20th century until the administration of the former President Alvaro Uribe 
Velez in 2002-2006 and 2006-2010, affected the nations’ economy, politics and society. In 
addition, this chapter is aimed at noticing the influence the greater international context 
has had on the ebbs and flows of conflict within Colombia. 
 
 
2.2 From La Violencia to the Formation of the Frente Nacional 
 
The period of 1948-1965 in Colombia’s history is commonly known as La violencia (the 
violence). This period got this name because of the extremely ferocious nature of the 
killings, maiming and dismembering that took place (Bailey, 562). The conflict was a result 
of a combination of factors such as ideological and territorial disputes. According to 
Zackrison, these factors combined during La violencia and produced a form of terrorism 
that was unique in Latin America (5). While there is some dispute over the origin of the 
conflict, they ascribe the starting point in 1948. The traditional Conservative Party 
(Conservadores), won the election for the presidential office after 16 years of Liberal 
(Liberales) rule. As the Liberals stepped off, the victorious conservatives were met with 
violence in different parts of the country. It is important to note that in general the 
Conseradores represented bureaucrats, high level military officers, large land owners and 
those who would best benefit from maintaining a socio-economic structure that would 
benefit the wealthy at the cost of the poor. Contrastingly, the Liberales represented 
business owners, indigenous communities and poor farm workers who sought to change 
the socio-economic structure and improve their (banrepcultural.org, 2017). The wave of 
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violence reached a higher level of political radicalization with the murder of the liberal 
leader Jorge Eliecer Gaitán on April 9th, 1948. Jorge was well known in the Colombian 
community for his strife against the ruling elite, his investigations of the massacres that 
took place in the banana plantations of the American company United Fruit Company. 
Furthermore, he was one of the leaders of the leftist political party Union Nacional de 
Izquierda Revolucionaria (UNIR) and was highly esteemed by the peoples because he 
fought for the interests of the poor, in particular of the farmers who were underrepresented 
at the time (telesur.net, 2018). His murder sparked mass protests that are now known as El 
Bogotazo. This occurrence received the name of Bogotazo because the concentration of the 
damages and confrontations that occured in Bogota. The strong protests, and the aggressive 
manner in which the police forces tried to suppress the protests resulted in the death or 
disappearance of roughly 3.000 people as well as over 140 buildings ruined in cities of 
Colombia(telesur.net,2018). 
 
During 1950s the violence was most evident amongst people affiliated with the two 
opposing political parties who constantly attacked each other’s properties (¡bastaya!,112). 
Roughly 200.000 people lost their lives as a result of the bi-partisan conflict during the 
period of 1948-1966. The majority of the losses took place during 1948-1953, the most 
intense years when it comes to the level of violence (¡bastaya!, 113). The ‘departamentos’ ― 
administrative departments or provinces that Colombia has been divided into―, that were 
the most affected by the violence were: Antiguo Caldas (24,6%), Tolima (17.2%), Antioquia 
(14,5%), north of Santander (11,6%), Santander (10,7%), Valle del Cauca (7,3%) (¡bastaya!, 
115). Furthermore, the rural landowners lost roughly 393.648 plots of land. The territories 
affected the most were: Valle del Cauca, Tolima, Cundinamarca, Norte de Santander and 
Antiguo Caldas (¡bastaya!, 115) (see Figure 1). These territories were scattered among 
different parts of Colombia and represented mainly rural areas. Furthermore, they 
represent the areas where the liberal, poor farm owner and workers were based. 
Consequently, it was seen as a betrayal of the state and conservatives against the liberals 
because they forcibly took land from the poor (ElTiempo.com, 2010). 
 
By 1958, the traditional Conservative and Liberal parties decided to join forces and 
establish the Frente Nacional (National Front). This was an agreement between Alberto 
Lleras Camargo, Liberal, and Laureano Gómez, Conservative, who were the leaders of the 
traditional parties in Colombia at the time. They intended to share the office by having the 
parties take 4 year turns ruling the country for a period of 16 years. In doing so, they 
wanted to put an end to the bi-partisan conflict (¡bastaya!, 115). The National Front lasted 
from 1958 until 1974. However, in forming the National Front, the traditional parties 
managed to exclude groups with differing political ideologies from the democratic process. 
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Consequently, this period played a major factor in the rise of guerrilla groups who were 
sympathised with by publics in rural areas that did not see eye to eye with the government. 
 
Figure 1. Political Map of Colombia 
 
Source: nationsonline.org, Klaus. “Map of Colombia - Nations Online Project." 
Nationsonline.org. N. p., 2018. Web. 6 Nov. 2018. 
 
 
Colombia’s political system had several defects and the National Front did not improve on 
them. Politics in Colombia was characterised by clientelism. During the years of the 
National Front, candidacies and public jobs were handed out to family members of the 
traditional parties. In addition to these political flaws, structural flaws such as high rates of 
inequality and poverty particularly in the rural areas of the country further exacerbated the 
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levels of discontent with the government. Furthermore, the state also lacked the ability to 
provide proper basic services to Colombians who lived in rural areas (Henderson, 14). 
 
In 1960, President Lleras Camargo proposed a set of agrarian reforms and projects to 
provide basic services to communities in rural areas. These policies were known as the Law 
of Agrarian Reform (Ley de Reforma Agraria) and the National Rehabilitation Plan (Plan 
Nacional de Rehabilitación) (¡bastaya!, 119). These projects included the re-opening of 
roads, the provision of medical aid and the construction of schools in rural areas (¡bastaya!, 
119). However, these programs were too few and far between precisely in the regions that 
needed it the most in the aftermath of La violencia. According to Offstein, corruption, 
limited funds and the slow pace of land reforms caused more frustrations in the groups that 
these reforms were meant to help. In addition, unemployment kept rising, the lack of low -
income housing and basic services in urban areas further challenged the government’s 
efforts to successfully bring about reforms and development (Offstein, 103). These factors 
would form the context within which groups with alternative ideologies began organizing 
and forming guerrilla-like movements. 
 
Parallel to these developments, Henderson argues that the period of 1965-1975 proved to 
be a positive decade for Colombia’s reputation (12). He noted the closer bilateral ties 
between Colombia and the United States. To Henderson, the return of what seemed like 
political peace as well as Colombia’s apparent ability to maintain macro-economic 
management and solid economic growth through the ‘La violencia’ years made Colombia 
(Henderson, 12). The United States was interested in Colombia to monitor the development 
of the guerrilla groups with communist ideologies in the context of the ongoing Cold War. 
They provided military training to Colombian officers in the U.S. Army School of the 
Americas in Panama. This training was used by the Colombian army to attack communist 
settlements in rural areas of the country. An additional outcome of this attack was the 
displacement of its inhabitants to the mountain parts in the south-eastern region of the 
country (Henderson,12). 
 
During the late 1960s through mid-1970s there were several indicators that economic 
conditions would improve for Colombia. The international price of coffee, the main 
commodity the country exported kept rising steadily and reached an all-time high mid-70s. 
In addition, local politicians took the steps to start exploiting coal deposits near the 
Caribbean coast. At the same time contracts were being signed for petroleum and natural 
gas exploration in eastern Llanos (Henderson, 12). However, by the end of the National 
Front, in the period of transitional government from 1974 to 1978, the Colombian economy 
began to slow down (See Figure 2 below). Indeed, in the period of mid to late 70’s 
Colombia’s GDP growth rate dropped from 7.7% in 1971 to 2.25% in 1975, after a brief 
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period of growth, the GDP growth rate dropped again in 1977 to 4.14%. The social 
conditions reversing again in urban areas and the public discontent became more evident. 
In this context, the guerrilla-group M-19 was formed. However, was not the first guerrilla 
that was formed, those will be elaborated upon in section 2.3 below. It is worth noting that 
were different from the other groups in rural areas because they primarily operated in 
urbanized zones (¡bastaya!, 131). Paradoxically, while the conditions were worsening in the 
urban areas, rural life had been improving as a result of the policies implemented under the 
Andrés Pastrana government (1998-2002). The reforms he introduced, known as the 
Programa de Desarrollo Rural Integral, DRI. The DRI replaced the land distribution policies 
with a policy based on productivity and commercialization to strengthen the economy of 
the most integrated rural regions (¡bastaya!, 132). This in turn opened the agricultural 
sector up to the international market. 
 
 
Figure 2. Colombia GDP Growth Rate 1961-2010 (Annual %) 
 
Source: World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files 2018 in 
"GDP Growth (Annual %) Data." Data.worldbank.org. N. p., 2018. Web. 5 Dec. 2018. 
 
 
2.3 The Formation of Guerrillas 
 
The guerrilla groups that would later pose a large threat to the state, can find their roots in 
the results of La violencia and the conditions described above during the period of the 
National Front. During the period of 1950 – 1958, violence became more organized through 
the formation of self-defence militias and bandit groups. These groups fought because of the 
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partisan disputes, but they also fought because of family vendettas, local disagreements 
over land and water rights and the control over coffee crops (Offstein, 102). 
 
Furthermore, During the period of the late 60s to the late 70s, several guerrilla groups 
continued the strife against the state. These groups represented different political 
ideologies and were organized among several territories of Colombia. The Fuerzas Armadas 
Revolucionarias Colombianas (Armed Revolutionary Forces of Colombia), commonly known 
as the FARC would become one of the strongest guerrilla movements. This group formed 
out of loosely organized groups mentioned above. However, the formal formation of the 
FARC occurs in 1964 with the appearance of the group in several departamentos in 
Colombia. Their first fronts were established along the Magdalena River, through the North 
eastern Antioquia and Córdoba and into the frontier area surrounding the Gulf of Urabá 
(see Figure 1 for visual reference). They selected these regions because they were lightly 
populated, they did not have a strong government presence and lacked social services. 
These conditions were used in their favour to convince the locals to support them and the 
Communist Party’s program. Consequently, the FARC gave a voice to the unheard poor 
living in rural areas (Henderson, 124). This Guerrilla group had strong links with the 
Colombian Communist Party (Partido Comunista Colombiano, the PCC for its acronym) 
(Offstein, 103). The PCC provided economic support and ideological orientation to this 
group while the guerrilla carried out actions in the field such as establishing new fronts in 
rural zones. 
 
Two other guerrillas that find their origins in the period of violence described above are the 
Ejército de Liberación Nacional (National Liberation Army), also known as the ELN; and the 
Ejército Popular de Liberación (Popular Liberation Army), EPL. These guerrillas also drew 
their recruits from the remaining bandits and organized groups from the period of La 
violencia (Offstein,104). The ELN consisted out of groups involved in La violencia as well as 
politically disenchanted students and recent college graduates in the provinces of 
Santander. The ELN was ideologically pursuing a Cuban-style revolution in Colombia. This 
ambition was in contrast to the ideals of the FARC who were influenced by the PCC which 
were being influenced by the Soviet-Union. The ELN received money and supplies from 
Cuba which aided in their formation (Offstein, 105). On the other hand, the EPL, which came 
a bit later after the formation of the ELN and the FARC was formed by a group of Maoist-
oriented people (Offstein, 105). 
 
The guerrilla groups seem to operate in different territories in Colombia. The ELN was 
present in the north-eastern areas of Colombia and the EPL was active in areas north of the 
FARC (Offstein, 104). At this point in the history of the guerrillas, what they all had in 
common was that they were fighting to end banditry in rural regions and to improve 
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agricultural working conditions and wages of the poor (Offstein, 105). Consequently, 
because the state had not been able to achieve this on its own, these guerrilla groups gained 
popularity and legitimacy in these rural regions. To fund their strife, these guerrillas would 
rely on the support of the rural communities as well as their extortion. During the 1960s the 
guerrillas were subject to national and international changes that weakened their 
organizations. 
 
The national armed forces began carrying out more effective counter-insurgency measures 
as a result of Plan Lazo, established in 1962. This plan consisted out of the restructuring of 
the military forces and giving them new training with a focus on counter-guerrilla tactics. 
The second part of Plan Lazo was community development, through the use of military 
resources in public projects and social programs. These community development efforts 
were aimed at improving the living conditions of the poor living both in rural and urban 
areas. The result of these programs was the reduction of the amount of people who would 
be open to be recruited by guerrillas (Offstein, 106). This caused the loss of political 
momentum which sparked the formation of the guerrillas. By 1975, the presence of 
guerrilla groups did not cause too many problems for the Colombian government because 
they had so little numbers, they lived in remote jungle areas (Henderson, 15). 
 
 
2.4 Paramilitary Self-defence Groups 
 
Paramilitary groups, or self-defence militias were created as a result of the expansion of 
guerrillas during the late 1970s and the national government's incapacity to properly 
protect its citizens from the crimes the guerrillas were committing. The Colombians living 
in rural areas had to suffer extortions and kidnappings of the guerrillas. Therefore, they 
began arming themselves and organizing themselves to defend their land and their families 
from the guerrillas. At first, the paramilitary groups had a legal status and they were trained 
and partially armed by the national military. The first groups were established in Middle 
Magdalena region, the eastern Antioquia and Córdoba. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, 
the paramilitary groups also aided Colombia's military in dealing with anti-establishment 
groups. When President Julio César Turbay (1978-1982) sent military forces to destroy 
marijuana crops in plantations along the northern Caribbean coast in 1978, he depleted the 
forces needed in the middle Magdalena region. The poorly staffed battalions that remained 
were not able to effectively carry out counter-insurgency missions against the guerrillas in 
those regions. As a result, in January 1981, the self defence group of Henry Pérez was 
formally installed (Henderson, 125). 
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Between 1996-1997 several paramilitary groups joined forces and formed the Autodefensas 
Unidas de Colombia (United Self-Defence Forces of Colombia), AUC. The AUC was led by 
Carlos Castaño Gil. This individual was one of the first in Colombia to create a paramilitary 
group. Born in Antioquia, his family began organizing themselves into a self-defence group 
after his father was captured by the FARC and died while in their captive in 1989. As a 
result, the family created the group called the Peasants and Self-Defence Forces of Córdoba 
and Uraba (trialinternational.org, 2016). However, as the guerrilla's grew in strength and 
numbers, so did the paramilitary groups (Henderson, 121). As the guerrillas acted with 
more impunity, so did the paramilitaries. They kept executing increasingly more violent 
acts as time passed by. They used threats, selective assassinations and massacres during the 
Belisario Betancur administration (1982-1986). As time went on, they resorted to the 
actions of capturing and disappearances of individuals, the collective massacres during the 
administrations Virgilio Barco Vargas (1986-1990) and César Gaviria Trujillo (1990-1994) 
(Rivera, 138). 
 
In a way, the state used the paramilitaries to wage a non-conventional war between the 
leftist guerrillas and the conservative paramilitares. In this unconventional war, the target 
that needed eliminated were not necessarily the guerrillas but the population that formed 
the social and political base of support for the enemy (Rivera, 139). The military let them do 
the dirty work. Both the guerrillas and paramilitary groups used illegal drug money to 
finance their operations and both settled in areas of the country that were strategic for the 
drug industry. Different paramilitary groups began behaving similar to the guerrillas, 
targeting areas with low social development and low presence of the state. They provided 
social programs such as building schools and teaching nationalism and right-wing ideals to 
the children of these regions. On the other hand, they continued to fight against the 
guerrillas. President Ernesto Samper (1994-1998) tried to regulate the paramilitary groups 
by creating Asociaciones Comunitarias de Vigilancia Rural (Convivir). The Convivir was an 
initiative between the state and paramilitary groups aimed at creating security 
cooperatives in rural areas in the hopes to gain peace and security in those zones 
(eltiempo.com,1997). Within these cooperatives it is estimated that 15.000 people were 
employed in several of the departamentos in Colombia (radionacional.co, 2016). They had 
their legal backing by the Decrees 2535 of 1993 and 356 od 1994. These decrees gave 
Convivir the function of providing intelligence to the armed forces. However, human rights 
activists and organizations such as Amnesty international raised their concerns because the 
Convivir could lead to further legalizations of armed groups in Colombia (eltiempo.com, 
1997). When the Convivir were disbanded in 1999, the government did not retrieve their 
arms and the members of Convivir became employed by wealthy farmers and drug 
traffickers (Rivera, 139). When they found that the state had become too lenient in the 
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peace negotiations between the state and the guerrillas in 1999, they focused their efforts 
to sabotage the peace process. 
 
 
2.5 Colombia’s drug trade with the US and a New Wave of Violence from 
the Drug Cartels 
 
The drug industry in Colombia was a result of the convergence of several national and 
international factors. Nationally, as has been described above, the poor socio-economic 
conditions of particularly the communities in the rural regions made them susceptible to 
criminal activity in order to survive. The fragmentation of the country’s territories also 
made it difficult for the state to effectively improve the living conditions and stimulate equal 
development nation-wide. The lightly populated departamentos in Eastern Llanos and the 
Amazonian watershed created perfect hiding spots for criminals. In addition, because the 
state has historically had difficulties with law enforcement throughout the national 
territory, those who wished to commit crimes felt confident that their chances of getting 
caught were slim (Henderson, 16). 
 
The international factor that played a role in the beginning and maintenance of the illegal 
drug trade in Colombia was the high demands for marijuana in the United States in the 
1960s as a result of the period of revolts and protests that were ongoing in the country. 
American smugglers found two areas which could supply the marijuana demanded in the 
U.S. First, the foothills of the Santa Marta mountain range; and second, the Gulf of Urabá at 
Colombia’s Caribbean coast (Henderson, 24). For a long time, both the Colombian 
government and the U.S. government did not realise that they had a growing drug-
trafficking industry between them because their attention was set on fighting the 
guerrilla’s. Within this context Colombia became one of the largest suppliers of marijuana to 
the U.S. When the demand switched from marijuana to cocaine around 1975, the industry 
became so lucrative for the drug traffickers that this money would be used by the drug 
Cartels to pay guerrillas such as the FARC to protect their coca crops, to pay off politicians 
in order to protect their political interests, as well as to fund the fighting amongst 
themselves. 
 
Both the Medellin Cartel and the Cali Cartel, were the largest and most popular criminal 
organizations during the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s. These cartels shaped a new wave of 
violence in Colombia. The illegal drug trading cartels waged war against the state in order 
to avoid the passing of the extradition treaty between Colombia and the U.S. Furthermore, 
they fought amongst themselves in order to obtain the monopoly over the drug trade with 
the US. This fight between the two cartels affected the members of the cartel, their families 
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and even friends of the family. While they did make use of the guerrilla as part of their drug 
operation, to protect their coca fields in rural areas, they also fought against them through 
the paramilitary called Muerte a Secuestradores (Death to Kidnappers, MAS). MAS was a 
retaliation against the guerrilla tactics of kidnapping their relatives. Consequently, while 
the illegal drug trade introduced a new and longer lasting flow of foreign exchange into the 
country it caused lives of thousands of Colombians. The years of 1980-1990 were some of 
the years with the highest level of crimes, massacres and terrorist attacks (See figures 3 and 
4 below). The drug cartels, the guerrillas and paramilitary groups carried out increasingly 
violent acts which reached peeks in the period of 1990- 2001. By the time the leaders of the 
Medellin Cartels were caught by law enforcement and extradited to the US to face charges 
or dead, smaller cartels and drug traffickers were already there to take over the industry 
and ensure that it kept growing. Some of the actors who would fill this power void included 
guerrillas and paramilitary groups. 
 
 
Figure 3. Total Reported Cases of Massacres and Terrorist Attacks in Colombia 1990-2010. 
 
Source: Bases de Datos - ¡¡bastaya! ! Colombia: Memorias de Guerra y Dignidad. N. p., 2018. Web. 6 Nov. 2018. 
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Figure 4. Recorded Number of Kidnappings in Colombia, 1970-2010. 
 
Source: Bases de Datos - ¡¡bastaya!! Colombia: Memorias de Guerra y Dignidad. N. p., 2018. Web. 6 Nov. 2018. 
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the size of the army and the national police forces. The main objectives of Plan Colombia 
were to first reduce the production of illegal drugs, primarily cocaine, by 50% in a period of 
6 years. The second objective was to improve security conditions in Colombia by regaining 
control of the areas in the country that were under the control of illegal and armed groups 
(Mejía, 51). With regards to fighting drug production, the main tactics used were: Reducing 
the amount of land used for coca production through the use of areal fumigation of the coca 
plantations with herbicides; Control the chemicals required to process coca leaves to create 
the base and cocaine hydrochloride as well as detecting and destroying the laboratories 
that used it to produce cocaine (Mejía, 52). To decrease the quantity of drugs being 
trafficked, authorities blocked the routes used by the drug traffickers to move the drugs to 
consumer countries (Mejía, 52). 
 
With his focus on controlling the rebels in the country he sought to use the resources of 
Plan Colombia such as the helicopters and equipment to end massacres, prevent the 
takeover of towns in rural areas and to prevent more kidnappings and the forced 
displacement of villagers. On the one hand, this hard-line approach towards the guerrilla's 
raised concerns of the potential of the state to cause further human rights abuses in villages 
and areas where the fights take place. On the other hand, there were also concerns about 
whether he would take this hard-line approach toward right-wing paramilitary forces 
because of their ties with the national military. On the matter of the paramilitaries, Rivera 
argues, Uribe applied the law of Peace and Justice, virtually legalizing paramilitaries in the 
sense that he continued to allow them to legalize their illegal earnings and allowing them to 
do public training exercises (Rivera, 140). Rather than dealing with the paramilitary groups 
with a firm hand as he had been doing with the guerrillas, President Uribe proposed the 
decree 2758,52. This decree would allow members of the paramilitary group AUC to avoid 
jail time for several crimes if they would admit their crimes and make symbolic acts of 
contrition such as paying fines. In return, the militia members would make peace with the 
state and hand in their guns (Posnanski, 727). On one hand, this would deactivate the 
paramilitary and bring an end to the mass violence perpetrated by them. On the other hand, 
the state would not be condemning the serious human rights abuses committed by these 
groups. Nevertheless, Uribe managed to disarm roughly 800 militia men that were 
members of the AUC (Posnanski, 728). 
 
During the Uribe administration Plan Colombia received large amounts of investments by 
the US. Despite these investments, Mejía argued Plan Colombia delivered mixed results. 
While the tactics did result in the eradication of large quantities of coca crops (See Table 1 
below). In addition to the support from the US, Uribe sought to garner support and 
multilateral cooperation for Colombia's efforts by defining the drug and guerrilla problems 
in ways that matched the international anti-drug regime (Borda, 105). The fight against 
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guerrillas and the drug industry in Colombia during the administration of Uribe has also 
been influenced by events in the US which caused a shift in their foreign policy towards 
Colombia. As a repercussion of the terrorist attacks on September 11th 2001, the US 
changed their securitization strategy and focused on the ‘global war against terrorism’ 
rather than the “war on drugs” (Tickner and Cepeda, 146). The shift from the war on drugs 
to the war on terrorism, in combination with the failed peace talks between the state and 
the FARC during the Pastrana administration became the justification to consider guerrillas 
as terrorists. Consequently, the main focus of the U.S. in Colombia became 
counterinsurgency efforts (Tickner and Cepeda, 146). 
 
 
Table 1: Harvest Potentials and Efforts to Decrease Coca Production 
Year Potential Harvest of Coca (square 
hectares) 
Eradication of Coca* 
(square hectares) 
1999 122,500 43,246 
2000 136,200 47,000 
2001 169,800 84,250 
2002 144,450 122,695 
2003 113,850 132,817 
2004 114,100 147,546 
2005 144,000 170,060 
2006 157,200 213,724 
2007 167,000 219,529 
2008 119,000 229,228 
2009 116,000 165,272 
2010 100,000 146,714 
*Includes both hand removal and spraying with pesticides. 
Source: International Narcotics Control Strategy Reports. State.gov. N. p., 2018. Web. 6 Nov. 2018. 
 
 
Despite these efforts, during his two presidential terms Uribe was unable to give the 
guerrillas their final blow. However, his terms resulted in the increased prosecution of 
guerrillas, the demobilization of paramilitary groups despite the methods he used caused 
protests and scandals. Consequently, by the end of the Uribe administration, the nation was 
seeking a different approach to the guerrilla and drug trafficking problem. 
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CHAPTER 3 
Promoting a New Colombia Abroad 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter the aim is analyse public diplomacy in Colombia's foreign policy. This will be 
done by focusing on both the national and foreign policy objectives set during the 
administration of President Juan Manuel Santos. During his presidency, it can be argued 
that Colombia has undergone a series of changes that have led to the decrease in the local 
violence levels, but also served as a positive light on Colombia as an international player. As 
can be inferred from the theories discussed in chapter 1, gaining the right attention and 
maintaining it from the target audience is a key challenge for countries using public 
diplomacy in their foreign policy strategies. In order to gain insight on the strategy used 
during the Santos administration, this chapter is structured as follows: First, the research 
methodology provides the general sources and analysis methods used in this chapter. 
Second, in the empirical analysis portion, this chapter will focus on three main components, 
starting with the political rise of President Juan Manuel Santos, by an overview of 
Colombia's national and foreign policy objectives over the period of 2010-2018. In addition, 
the various plans to promote Colombia abroad known as Plan de Promoción de Colombia en 
el Exterior, and some examples will be given. Finally, this chapter will refer to Zaharna's 
communication frameworks described in chapter 1 to determine in which category the 
strategies used during this administration can be placed. 
 
 
3.2 Methodology 
 
The evidence used in this chapter has been primarily gathered from policy documents, in 
particular the National Development Plans of 2010-2014 and of 2014 -2018 which are the 
development plans and policies that were meant to be implemented during Santos 
administration. In addition, several of the Plan de Promoción de Colombia en el Exterior 
documents are used to source the main vision, goals, and strategies used as public 
diplomacy strategy of Colombia. This has been done in order to determine the nature of 
Colombia’s foreign policy as well as the background and political stand point of president 
Juan Manuel Santos. 
 
 
 29 
 
3.3 Juan Manuel Santos: Political Background and rise to the Presidential 
Office 
 
Some might argue that Santos was born to have a political career, considering he was born 
into a family with great political influence. His great-uncle Eduardo Santos Montejo was 
Colombia’s president from 1938-1942, his cousin Francisco Santos Calderón was the vice 
president of Colombia during 2002-2010 under the former president Uribe. Furthermore, 
the Santos family also founded El Tiempo, one of Colombia’s largest newspapers 
(brittanica.com,2018). Santos is also highly educated with degrees in economics and 
business, as well as a master degree in public administration from the University of Harvard 
(Brittanica.com, 2018). Santos had been working in politics in Colombia since the 1990s, he 
began as the minister of commerce in 1991-1994 under president César Gaviria (Ortiz de 
Zárate, 2016). He later became the minister of finance under the conservative president 
Pastrana during 2000-2002. He also created the Partido de la U (Partido de la Unidad 
Nacional, the National Unity Party) in 2005, taking a step away from the traditional liberal 
party and forming greater ties with Uribe (Ortiz de Zárate, 2016). 
 
His rise to the presidential office continued when he became the minister of defence under 
the former president Uribe from 2006 to 2009 (Ortiz de Zárate, 2016). While functioning as 
the minister of defence of Colombia, Santos gained greater popularity for being hard 
handed, as was the nature of the Uribe administration against the guerrillas and drug 
cartels. One of the most well-known successful missions carried out against the FARC 
during his role as the minister of defence was the liberation of Ingrid Betancourt in July 
2008 (Ortiz de Zárate, 2016). Betancourt was a Colombian-French politician who was 
abducted and held captive by the FARC when she was running for the presidential office in 
2002 (Brittanica.com,2018). Using the popularity, he gained by the successes of the 
missions carried out while he was the defence minister, with the endorsement of the 
outgoing president Uribe and Santos’ own campaigning promise to uphold and even protect 
the legacy of Uribe, he won both the first and second round of elections in Colombia. The 
first electoral rounds were won with 47% of the votes in his favour, the second round of 
votes resulted in 69% of the votes in his favour (Brittanica.com,2018). Santos’ presidency 
lasted two terms from 2010-2014 and 2014-2018, they have arguably caused drastic 
changes in both the Colombian government and its’ international reputation. 
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3.4 From National to Foreign Policy Priorities in the Eight Year Santos 
Administration 
 
In Colombia, the national development plan also known as the Plan Nacional de Desarrollo 
(PND), is where presidents and their administration set out their policy goals and strategies 
for the period of 4 years that they are in office. The national development plan of 2010-
2014 for Colombia, named Prosperidad para Todos (Prosperity for All), aimed at Colombia 
becoming a prosperous country for all with more employment, less poverty and more 
security (PND 2010-2014 Tomo I, 23). The PND 2010-2014 was based on three pillars to 
achieve democratic prosperity, namely: sustainable economic growth; equality in 
opportunities so that Colombians have access to the tools they need to forge their own 
destiny, and consolidating peace in all territories of Colombia. On these pillars the main 
policy priorities for the period 2010-2014 were: 
1. Innovation, 
2. Good governance, 
3. Increasing the presence and relevance of Colombia on the international market, in 
multilateral relations and international agenda setting, 
4. Environmental sustainability. 
 
From these priorities, the main focus in this case is policy priority number 3. When it 
concerns Colombia’s foreign policy, in Santos first term the administration sought out to 
increase the international relevance of Colombia on the international market, in general 
international relations as well as in having a more prominent role in agenda setting in 
multilateral contexts and international cooperation (PND 2010-2014 Tomo I, 23). To 
achieve this goal the foreign policy agenda was set around the following strategies (See PND 
2010-2014 Tomo II, 672-690): 
1. To open Colombia’s economy up to the international market. 
2. To secure relationships with existing allies (e.g.: in Latin America and the Caribbean, 
the U.S. and European Union) and establish relationships with new partners (East- 
Asia) that will help promote integration and development. 
3. To diversify the relationship of Colombia and other agents in the multilateral 
context. 
4. To strengthen migration policy and consular services abroad. 
5. To strengthen and diversify international cooperation as both a donor and a 
recipient country. 
6. To develop the Colombian maritime and terrestrial border regions. 
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During the second term of Santos’ presidency, the new national development plan, Plan 
Nacional de Desarrollo Todos por un Nuevo País (Everyone for a New Country), had a slight 
shift in focus, emphasizing the efforts needed to achieve peace, equality and a just society 
(PND 2014-2018 Tomo I, 23). The main foreign policy objectives for this period were (see 
PND 2014-2018 Tomo II, 641-644): 
1. To diversify the foreign policy agenda to include national development areas (such 
as education, agriculture, infrastructure, environment, energy and commerce), 
strengthening bilateral relations and ensuring that previously made agreements are 
complied with. 
2. To consolidate Colombia’s presence and positioning in the international, multilateral 
and regional organizations to promote Colombia’s national interests. 
3. To strengthen migratory policies and consular services to broaden the attention and 
integration of Colombian citizens abroad. 
4. To stimulate social and economic development and integration of Colombia’s 
frontier regions with its neighbouring countries. 
5. To institutionally strengthen the ministry of foreign affairs to achieve transparent 
and effective management. 
6. To consolidate the supply and demand of international cooperation based on the 
foreign policy objectives and pillars of the national development plan (peace, 
equality and education) as well as strengthening regional cooperation strategies 
with Latin America and the Caribbean, Asia-Pacific, Central Asia and Africa. 
 
It is important to note that controlling if all of these national and foreign policies were 
implemented and the degree to which they were successful, is not the case for this study. 
However, these policy priorities should be, if soft power and public diplomacy authors are 
to be consulted, the basis upon which state governments shape their messages and 
strategies to engage with foreign audiences. Furthermore, based on the foreign policy 
objectives it can be said that the Santos administration had the ambition to gain greater soft 
power. By gaining greater international relevance, Colombia would gain access to channels 
that can later be used to frame international issues to suit their needs. Furthermore, the 
planned efforts to would have resulted in forging greater credibility of both the domestic 
and international behaviour of Colombia. In the context of foreign policy in the second term 
of the Santos administration, the first foreign policy objective was pursued with a two-
pronged approach consisting out of: 
a) Strengthening bilateral relations with the traditional partners such as the U.S., E.U. 
as was mentioned above as well as new potential partners by having high level visits, 
technical missions, and cooperation projects; 
b)  By promoting Colombia as a contemporary country that is innovative, diverse, 
inclusive and committed to achieving peaceful cohabitation with all countries with 
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the Plan de Promoción de Colombia en el Exterior, Plan to Promote Colombia Abroad 
(will be referred to as PPCE in the following sections) (See PND 2014-2018 Tomo II, 
642). 
 
With the second part of this strategy, it is important to note the values and characteristics 
that were chosen as the things that would be promoted abroad. These values of innovation, 
inclusion and emphasis on peaceful cohabitation, if they are promoted on the foundation of 
Colombia’s national policies, values and institutions could result in increasing Colombia’s 
soft power. Consequently, these plans to promote Colombia abroad as a part of the foreign 
policy of Colombia will be delved into further in the following section below. 
 
 
3.5 Promoting Colombia to Foreign Audiences 
 
The Plan de Promoción de Colombia en el Exterior or PPCE, is not an invention of the Santos 
administration. This plan has been adopted in Colombia’s foreign policy strategies since 
1983(PPCE Resumen 2015, 3). However, what makes this plan worth discussing is the 
policy context within which it has been implemented during the Santos administration. This 
is because of the emphasis that this administration placed on stepping away from the legacy 
of violence in Colombia, pursuing greater and sustainable development, as well as the 
ambition to become a relevant and more powerful international actor as can be seen from 
the policy objectives mentioned above. The PPCE consists out of yearly plans of cultural 
activities carried out by Misiones de Colombia en el Exterior (Colombian Missions Abroad), 
which is what they call their embassies, consulates and delegations stationed abroad. 
Currently, these missions are spread across the world, as can be seen in figure 5 below, the 
majority are stationed in the Americas (Canada, U.S. and Latin American countries). Many of 
the countries in this region have been allies of Colombia for years. However, they also 
reached a representation of 33 missions in Asia which has also been on the foreign policy 
agenda as important relationships to build and maintain (PND 2010-2014 Tomo II, 684). 
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Figure 5. Distribution of Colombian Missions Abroad 
 
Source: Datos.gov.co. N. p., 2018. Web. 4 Dec. 2018. 
 
 
The events and activities that are carried out under the PPCE are meant to benefit and 
impact the people in the country that the Colombian Mission Abroad is hosting the event in. 
Furthermore, these activities primarily target all members of the foreign public ranging 
from government officials to investors, to students and the general population (PPCE 
Resumen 2015, 8). 
 
During this administration the PPCE used what they called Diplomacia Cultural and 
Diplomacia de Deportes (cultural diplomacy and sports diplomacy) to promote Colombia to 
the traditional partners and to new prospective partners abroad. As has been noted in 
chapter 1, one of the challenges in public diplomacy scholarship is the nature of its 
definition. In her analysis of the U.S.’s diplomatic strategies, Schneider has also come across 
this issue. Schneider argued that cultural diplomacy is a practice that is an important 
component of the broader foreign policy tool known as public diplomacy − because cultural 
diplomacy is exchanging ideas, information, art and different aspects of a country’s culture 
to foreign nations and fostering mutual understanding which ultimately are things that a 
nation does to explain itself to the rest of the world (Schneider, 147). While in the PPCE 
plans they do not mention public diplomacy as the greater strategy, the ministry of foreign 
affairs of Colombia has referred to these activities as public diplomacy in the document 
Memorias al Congreso 2016-2017 (100). Therefore, in the case presented here, cultural 
98
62
33
7
13
Number of Colombian Missions Abroad per Region
Americas Europe Asia Oceania Africa
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diplomacy activities and sport diplomacy activities carried out in the context of the PPCE 
are considered as public diplomacy initiatives. 
 
The greater purpose of these activities was to: 
 
“Strengthen international relations and improve the perception [that] the foreign publics 
[have of] the image of the country abroad, through various cultural activities that factor the 
knowledge of the cultural expressions and Colombian diversity” (PPCE Resumen 2015, 7). 
 
This strategy is based on the thought that cultural diplomacy can contribute by creating 
dialogue opportunities for Colombia with actors of strategic importance for its policy 
priorities. Furthermore, cultural activities can promote positive images of Colombia, as well 
as aid in building relationships based on trust, which has been a core value in the 
relationship building process this administration set out to do. In addition, these cultural 
activities were seen to be able to promote great social, historical and cultural understanding 
of Colombia as a country abroad (PPCE Resumen 2013, 10). There are several types of 
activities that are organized within the framework of the PPCE. These activities involve 
sports, visual arts, music, academic and literature functions, gastronomy, cinematography, 
multidisciplinary arts (PPCE Resumen 2013, 6-8). These activities or initiatives serve two 
functional purposes. First, they provide Colombian delegates and officials with a speaking 
engagement opportunity, which they can use to promote a positive image of Colombia as 
well as touch upon policy related issues. Second, each of these activities provide the 
audience with more insight on Colombia’s culture. 
 
While PPCE has been part of the foreign policy of Colombia for years, the Santos 
administration began emphasizing their efforts in this area around mid.- 2013. This is not 
to say the PPCE had been inactive until 2013, the Colombian Missions abroad have 
continuously carried out events and activities based on the PPCE in periods before and 
during the Santos administration. Furthermore, there are some general trends worth 
noticing. First, funding for PPCE activities in 2013 were 13.143.000 million Colombian 
pesos, nearly doubling the one of 2010 which was 6.000.00 million pesos (see table 2 
below). Second, while in the second term of Santos presidency the government placed 
greater emphasis on promoting Colombia abroad with the set of values mentioned above, 
both the funding and number of activities dropped throughout the years. 
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Table 2. Number of Countries where PPCE Activities have been held 2010-2017 
Year Number of Countries Number of Activities 
Carried out 
2010 46 231 
2011 54 149 
2012 59 185 
2013 70 314 
2014 54 214 
2015 58 199 
2016 66 223 
2017 65 380 
Source: Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores (2013; 2014; 2015; 2016-2017; 2017-2018), 
Bogotá, 2018. < http://www.cancilleria.gov.co/ministry/strategy/informes> 
 
 
Next to these trends, it is noteworthy that the activities with the highest numbers 
throughout the years were Music, Academics and Literature, and Cinematography. For 
example, in the Academics and Literature initiative, the ELE Focalae1 program has been an 
initiative to teach Spanish lessons to delegates of Asian countries. This initiative began as a 
result of the increasing amounts of Spanish speaking tourists visiting East Asian countries. 
While this initiative began in 2013, with its main focus being East Asia, by 2017 the 
program expanded to Asia+, making room for delegates of India, Nepal, Sri Lanka to also 
participate (apccolombia.gov, 2018). By 2018, this program became East Asia, Central Asia 
and Africa, resulting in the program encompassing 37 countries with 381 beneficiaries 
(apccolombia.gov, 2018). The aim of the ELE program is to promote Colombia as a country 
that offers high quality education, particularly high-quality Spanish courses through the 
provision of scholarships to students who wish to learn Spanish as a foreign language in 
Colombia (apccolombia.gov, 2018). For the year 2018, the Colombian government offered 
60 scholarships for tourist guides, undergraduate and graduate students to study Spanish in 
Colombia for 4 months (io.its.ac.id, 2018). During the period that these students stayed in 
Colombia they also were given the opportunity to learn about Colombia’s culture, history, 
and geography. Consequently, while they gain a new skill in Colombia, they also gain 
greater understanding of the country and can bring these experiences back with them when 
they return to their countries. 
 
In the case of musical initiatives, these are mainly concerts held in different countries to 
familiarize the audiences with typical music of the different regions in Colombia such as 
                                                             
1 ELE is  the acronym for Espagnol Langue Étrangère (Spanish as a Foreign Language), and Focalae is the acronym 
for the Foro de Cooperación América Latina-Asia del Este (The Forum East Asia-Latin America Cooperation).  
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Vallenato, Joropo and Chimia (PPCE Resumen 2013, 22). An example of this initiative 
occurred in April of 2015. In this period, 10 young students of the school named Institución 
Educativa Antonia Santos, also known as ‘El Rancho’, visited Antalya, Turkey to perform on 
several stages in the city. In addition, these youths had the opportunity to go on cultural 
excursions in the city and surrounding areas (PPCE Resumen 2015, 22). However, the key 
activities that helped to promote Colombia abroad was their opportunities to participate in 
a nationally transmitted gala by local Turkish television (PPCE Resumen 2015,22). They 
also visited with local delegates as well as delegates of nearly 40 countries (PPCE Resumen 
2015, 23). This example shows that not only was Colombia exporting its culture to different 
regions, but they also took advantage of situations that could increase the exposure of their 
culture to both the general public in a country, in this case in Turkey, but also to delegates 
from around the world. Furthermore, the travel and activities that these youths carried out 
would also bring them into contact with some cultural aspects of Turkey, expanding their 
knowledge and understanding of a foreign culture. Consequently, while the intention might 
be to promote Colombia abroad, those individuals would also be left with an impression of 
Turkey and bring that back to Colombia with them. However, the greater impact of these 
small groups going abroad and coming back on the culture of Colombia remains to be seen. 
 
In the case of sports initiatives, one example was the Rugby exchange in March of 2015. A 
group of 12 young rugby players from Buenaventura and Tierralta travelled to Buenos 
Aires and Trelew in Argentina. During their program they attended workshops, met with 
the Argentinian Rugby Union in Buenos Aires as well as gone to visits in the city (PPCE 
Resumen 2015, 20). Other sports related activities in 2015 were Volley ball excursions in 
Brazil, Soccer in Germany and Poland, and Baseball in the United States. These exchanges 
served a similar purpose as the music initiatives in Turkey. Namely, the young athletes that 
would go abroad would interact with athletes in the country they are visiting and during 
this interaction both gain a perspective of a foreign culture as well as provide insight on the 
Colombian culture. 
 
 
3.6 The Zaharna Frameworks in the Case of Colombia and Additional 
Observations 
 
Looking at Santos political career gives insight on how he was able to rise through several 
political ranks in order to gain his presidency. Furthermore, it provides information on 
which issues were high on the political agenda. In addition, it provides more information 
regarding the basis of Colombia's soft power. As has been argued in chapter one, a country's 
soft power is formed by its local policies, values and institutions and culture. 
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As can be seen from the foreign policy priorities and the PPCE, Colombia’s strategy to 
improve its foreign image has rested on what they call cultural diplomacy and sport 
diplomacy. From an international relations point of view, it can be said that the soft power 
resources this public diplomacy carried out by Colombia during 2010-2018 has been based 
on the notion that Colombia has been moving away from violence and corruption, towards 
peaceful cohabitation with great cultural experiences to offer abroad. Furthermore, when it 
comes to the identification of the target audiences, it is clear that based on the strategic 
importance of both maintaining old relationships and creating new ones, and the general 
audience identified by the PPCE reports, the audience can be narrowed down to the general 
public of countries such as: Argentina, Brazil, India, Sri Lanka, Poland, and Turkey to name a 
few. 
 
The Zaharna communication frameworks can be used to categorize the PPCE efforts, it can 
be said that the general strategies have included several characteristics and initiatives that 
pertain to the relational framework. The language in the national development plans and 
the PPCE reports indicate that the primary objective has been to either maintain, 
strengthen or establish relationships that are of strategic importance to Colombia’s 
interests. Furthermore, while the core message that is being promoted is that of a friendly 
and contemporary Colombia which might hint toward the information framework. The 
PPCE context, which has shown the side of Colombia with great music, sports abilities, and 
language courses, to name a few of the cultural resources, in the PPCE framework there is a 
lot of room for the individuals who take part in these exchanges and activities to interact 
and learn from each other. Collaborating with other countries, as has been done in the ELE 
Focalae language course provided the context for the participating countries to interact 
with each other in Colombia for a certain amount of time. The success has also fostered the 
expansion of this program over the years. When it comes to the sporting initiatives and 
music initiatives, the exchanges are of shorter time-span, and promotes interactions 
between the athletes, or between the musicians and state representatives they were able to 
meet with. Therefore, if the PPCE activities throughout the Santos administration would 
have to be labelled within a communication framework, based on these characteristics it 
would be the relational framework. Because of the nature of the initiatives, being short 
term exchanges and visits it can be said that the activities carried out in the PPCE context 
during the Santos administration have mainly been focused on the first tier of the relational 
communication framework. There is still a cause to also consider the second tier of the 
relational framework because of the nature of the ELE Focalae program which has already 
expanded twice since its inception in 2013 and has had its 6th round of scholarships during 
2018. 
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However, it still remains to be seen what the long-term impact has been of all of these 
initiatives, this is a primary characteristic of soft power and public diplomacy itself as has 
been argued by the scholars surveyed in chapter 1. While short term initiatives such as 
sending young musicians abroad might be able to be broadcasted to a wider public in a 
foreign country, there is no direct policy result from these events. Because the greater 
foreign policy objective the PPCE was used for, opening avenues for interaction and 
exposing Colombia’s culture abroad, it is understandable that there are no direct policy 
expectations set for these events either. Another area worth exploring is the impact of 
social media and the manner in which states now have to compete with several nonstate 
actors to promote themselves abroad. It would also be interesting to see how the PPCE 
might compare to the strategies of greater powers such as that of Canada or the U.S. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
To sum up, in this thesis, the primary focus has been on public diplomacy as a strategy in 
Colombia's foreign policy. As has been elaborated upon in the first chapter, this soft power 
policy tool lacks a concrete definition, a characteristic that makes it challenging for both 
scholars and policy makers to identify which activities do and do not belong under this 
framework. This Nevertheless, from the four contributing disciplines cited above 
(international relations, communication, branding, and public relations), due to the subject 
matter of the case study, the analysis has been mainly shaped from an international relation 
− soft power perspective. Furthermore, this thesis has taken the two communication 
frameworks under which Zaharna has argued that public diplomacy strategies can be 
categorized: information framework and the relational framework as one of the points to 
analyse when it concerns Colombia's public diplomacy strategy during the 8-year term of 
former President Santos. Before delving into this analysis, it was important to take note of 
the greater historical, social and political context of Colombia. This task was done in 
Chapter two, where several trends are noteworthy. First of all, the over 50 yearlong reality 
of violence in Colombia has been caused by several political, social, and geographic 
fragmentation. Furthermore, as several waves of violence rose and fell during the decades, 
different actors such as the cartels, the guerrillas, paramilitary groups, and national military 
forces contributed to complicating the nature of the violence further. From an international 
relations perspective, both in the early years of what has been called La violencia until the 
recent mixed results of the Plan Colombia, it can be said that in particular the U.S. and the 
world market had great influence on the nature of the events that took place. 
 
This also indicates the nature of the position of Colombia within the greater international 
arena. Both the Colombian state and the violent non-state actors (guerrillas, drug traffickers 
and cartels, and paramilitary groups) relied on foreign support. This support often 
depended on factors that the country had no influence on at the time. Cases such as the 
trends in the U.S. that sparked the demand for both marijuana and later cocaine; and cases 
where greater powers supported small in order to by proxy spread their ideology around 
the world.While the situation in Colombia did cause for people to call for change, it remains 
to be seen whether the guerrillas such as the FARC could have financially maintained their 
efforts without the support of foreign agents in the early stages of their inception; and 
without the illegal drug market in later years. However, the state also relied on the help of 
foreign agents, particularly the U.S. for military aid and financial aid to help resolve the 
various crisis resulting from. Consequently, up until recent years, Colombia was not in a 
powerful position on the international arena. 
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After some economic growth in recent years, and the hard-handed approach of the 
government against the illicit drug trade and the guerrillas, Colombia has slowly gained 
more power internationally. However, it was still in need of various reforms and to improve 
its international reputation. These needs were identified by the state during the Santos 
administration. The ambition to become a more prominent international actor was written 
out in goals such as increasing the country’s economic integration with the world market, 
gaining greater agenda setting positions, and promoting Colombia abroad as an innovative, 
contemporary country seeking peaceful cohabitation. Furthermore, to achieve this goal, the 
Foreign Affairs Ministry engaged the efforts of the embassies, consulates and delegates 
abroad to organize cultural and sport’s related activities under the framework of the PPCE. 
These initiatives were the focus of the analysis in chapter three. The issue of defining public 
diplomacy returned in this chapter. However, it has been argued that both cultural 
diplomacy and sports diplomacy can be considered as part of public diplomacy. 
 
Based on the nature of the initiatives carried out in the PPCE framework - the examples 
used were the ELE Focalae program; Music initiatives such as the one that took place in 
Turky, and sporting activities in various parts of the world, it has been argued that the 
activities carried out during the Santos administration fall mainly under the relational 
communication framework presented by Zaharna. While the activities at this stage can 
mainly be considered as the first tier of the relational framework, there seems to be 
potential for educational initiatives such as ELE Focalae to be part of the second tier of the 
relational framework. 
 
To answer the question raised in this thesis, while the PPCE was not an invention of the 
Santos administration, during the past 8 years Colombia has primarily used its vast culture 
and sports to show a more positive and friendly face to the world. Furthermore, the overall 
public diplomacy strategy consisted out first identifying target audiences: both traditional 
partners of Colombia and new potential partners that could benefit Colombia’s national 
interests. Then, the Colombian government organized high-level visits and mobilized its 
Colombian missions abroad to create opportunities to showcase what Colombia has to offer 
culturally in the hopes of leaving behind a positive impression in the audiences where these 
activities were carried out. In addition, these initiatives opened up the platforms for 
delegates to discuss policy issues as well as to start building new relationships abroad. This 
in turn was meant to start building part the foundations upon which Colombia can continue 
to increase its international relevance and power. 
 
However, as has been noted in chapter 3, these initiatives were opportunities to engage 
with foreign audiences. This results in both the Colombians who were sent out to carry out 
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these activities being left with an impression of the country they were in, as well as the 
audience of the country on the receiving end being left with an impression of Colombia’s 
culture. This exchange has yet to be fully analysed. Another area that requires further 
exploration is the interaction between the efforts of the Colombian government to promote 
Colombia abroad, with the various other agents in the international arena. 
 
The public diplomacy strategy described in this case has relied on the vision that the Santos 
administration wanted to promote abroad. With the new government in place, it remains to 
be seen whether this same image will be used, or if they will promote other aspects of 
Colombia abroad. Public diplomacy, as mentioned in chapter 1, is able to provide a change 
in international perception of a country on the long-term.  In the case that a new 
administration changes the message and methods used to promote Colombia abroad, then 
this might lengthen the time it takes for this country to distance itself from the darker 
aspects of its reputation. Furthermore, the film industry in Hollywood, has been 
continuously publishing films that depict the stories of Colombian cartels, their leaders and 
how they were caught by foreign officials. This has been an additional reminder of 
Colombia's not so distant past. In these films the protagonists are often U.S operatives. 
These films offer up a continual reminder of violence and corruption in Colombia to the 
world audience. The way in which Colombia is depicted in these media also challenge the 
more positive narrative that the strategies used with the PPCE try to promote of the 
country abroad. These factors pose challenges to the impact Colombia’s PPCE can have on 
the perception of the world to the country’s image.  
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